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Book Review

Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin
Laden and 9/11
By
Saleem Shahzad
Sikandar Tangi
Peshawar University
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Salim Shahzad's investigative journalism explores the hidden
tentacles of Al-Qaeda, the book analyzes the modus operandi and
future plans of its looming lethality as a massive outfit. The author
reminds his readers about the intelligence and tactics of Al-Qaeda,
which has outsmarted its enemies on a number of occasions and has
an exceptional ability to utilize situations in their favor. The book
unfolds several events that were cleverly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda.
The author is confident that Al-Qaeda and Taliban cannot be defeated
with the present policies adopted by US and its allies, although he
does not provide any suggestions on how this information should be
used to overwhelm the surge of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

THE MUSLIM RULING ELITES
Knowing about the mistrust and the gap that exists between
the Muslim ruling elites and the people, Al-Qaeda takes full advantage
of this division. Al-Qaeda plans to unite all Muslim militant outfits
under the command of Al-Qaeda and to organize them into one
group, in order to be more effective against the West and the Muslim
ruling elites. In the post 9/11 world, the Muslim ruling elite and the
West are considered partners and enemies of Al-Qaeda, and as such
the recent policy of the Pakistani Janissaries (TTP) is to first target the
Pakistan Armed forces and then engage with the foreign troops. The
objective has been to cause the masses to become disenchanted from
their ruling elite and to engage the state elements against each other.
In this manner, Al-Qaeda would ease the pressure on them and they
would be more focused on the global agenda.
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POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE
Since 9/11, Al-Qaeda has developed a politics of war and
peace. It maneuvered through peace accords in Pakistan to create an
enlarged space within which to wage war. It sabotaged the peace
process many times by war and this remains a never-ending process
until a final victory can be announced. For that purpose they started
their hunt for natural leaders and created their fieriest group of
Janissaries-the Ibnul Balad (Sons of the Soil). The Pakistani
Janissaries/TTP is the most effective weapon of Al-Qaeda and is used
against their own governments.
THE NEO-TALIBAN
Al-Qaeda established the first-ever popular local and fully
tribally supported 'Al-Qaeda Franchise' in the world. Thus, if in the
future the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani military
establishment were ever to plan reconciliation with the West, this Neo
-Taliban will be there to oppose them and to remind their Afghan
comrades that the Jihadi agenda does end in Afghanistan, but is set to
circle around the world. In the meantime, Al-Qaeda could deploy the
TTP to help break any obstructions erected by Pakistan's government.
Paradoxically, the enforcement of Islamic law had never been the aim
of the Neo-Taliban. The Swat showdown in 2007 was not fought
because the government had refused to comply with the Taliban's
demand to introduce Sharia Law, it was a bid to set up another smoke
screen to eradicate the US presence in the region and discourage any
thoughts of dialogue with the Taliban.
According to its new policy, Al-Qaeda doesn’t want to
confront its enemies directly but wishes instead to use the local people
against their own governments and NATO. Al-Qaeda is now more a
manipulator than a militant organization fighting it enemies.
According to Al-Qaeda's plan, the Pakistani militants have challenged
the local tribal authority and systematically destroyed the thousand
years old customs by replacing them with Salafi and Wahabi ideology.
Thus the command along tribal lines that once existed is broken. AlQaeda's strategy is to combine all the tribal areas into one unit against
the old tribal system of the Pakistan government. It eliminated the
British installed tribal system and the Pakistan Army could not do
anything to prevent this.
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SAFE HAVEN
Al-Qaeda plans to move into Pakistani tribal areas in order to
make Pakistan the new theater of war. The author argues that AlQaeda did not originally intend to launch Jihad in Pakistan, but when
Pakistan sided with America in Afghanistan it was left with a dilemma
which they resolved by considering Pakistan no less an enemy than
the Western allies of the US. This policy is evident from the activities
of TTP, which is continuously targeting the Pakistani state's assets and
army installations.
ESCALATING THE WAR
To overcome the present impasse, Al Qaeda adopted a policy
of expanding the war beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan. The idea was
originally the brainchild of one of the fieriest neo-Taliban named Ilyas
Kashmiri. Ilyas Kashmiri was supposedly killed in the 3 rd June 2011
drone attack.
BEHIND THE SCENES
Al-Qaeda and Taliban never held identical objectives.
Ironically, the Taliban has always been used as a strategic weapon by
Al-Qaeda and by Pakistan. Even before the fall of the Afghan
Taliban's government in 2001, Al-Qaeda had strong influence over
Mullah Omer and the Taliban Shura. Its influence grew more after the
American attack. America seriously underestimated the strength of AlQaeda and the Taliban, and therefore it lost the chance to politically
engage the Taliban. Therefore, Al-Qaeda never thought of
reconciliation with the Taliban, which it now seems ready to pursue
today. Had America dealt with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with
different tools, the resulting situation would have been more in
American's favor and Al-Qaeda could have been made isolated or
ousted from Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda does not want peace in the region and does not
allow the Taliban to be recognized by the world. In other words, if
peace comes in Afghanistan then Al-Qaeda cannot pursue its global
agenda of escalating war into the whole of South and central Asia. It is
believed that the real war theater will begin once the Western coalition
leaves, because Al-Qaeda doesn’t want to fight with the Western
coalition forces. It wants to exhaust the coalition forces and to
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preserve its energies for the final blow in the Pakistan battlefield. The
recent trust deficit and disengagement between America and Pakistan
is surely celebrated by Al-Qaeda as a victory.
PAKISTAN BEARS THE BRUNT
Al-Qaeda’s strategic planning is so impressive that it has
survived to this day, and many believe that it has become increasingly
united and threatening. Al-Qaeda appears to have already won the
battle and has defeated its enemies by outwitting them. It was part of
the Al-Qaeda peace and war policy to force the Pakistani government
to make agreements with the Taliban (Shakai 2004 and Sarogha 2005
and 2006), and this paved the way for Al-Qaeda to penetrate into the
tribal areas of Pakistan and to establish its strategic presence. As a
result of the 2006 peace agreement, an unknown amount of money
was transferred from the Pakistani government vault to the militants;
at this time the clinical term "foreigners" was used to refer to AlQaeda. Time has already proved that Al-Qaeda is on the winning side.
The 2006 spring offensive was Al-Qaeda's watershed, and after this
time Al-Qaeda clearly dominated Pakistan in 2007 and 2008, with the
expansion of operations into India in late 2008. A theater of war was
then begun in Chechnya in the year 2010.
One of Al-Qaeda's members, Sheikh Essa was given the task
to preach the need for a war against Pakistan. Al-Qaeda knows that it
was only because of the Pakistan army that the US had been
successful against the Afghan Taliban. He visited all the tribal areas
and convinced the tribal groups that their suffering is because of
Pakistan. He even went to the extent of saying that those who crossed
the border to fight against the US in Afghanistan were deviants, and
that the real battle had to be fought against Pakistan's ruling military
establishment. On the other hand, America thinks of Pakistan not
only as a sanctuary to Taliban, but also as a problem for the US and
considers Pakistan's tribal areas the root cause of insurgency. Pakistan
seems to be in great trouble from all the sides.
IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION
The global Jihadi organizations actions and activities are
mostly inspired from the political philosophy of the 14 th century
ideologue Ibna-Taymmiyaa (1263–1328 CE) whose beliefs were
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popular for the next 1000 years. Tamiyyah was considered the model
of ideological resistance in the Muslim world, and his ideas are still the
direct source for Islamic revolutionaries. Tamiyyah aimed to shock
deviants by declaring them non-Muslims. Al-Qaeda's
ideological discourse starts with the interpretations of Tamiyyah and
end with Syed Qutb; their extremist actions are further supported by
the more recent work of Abdul Wahab Najadi (1703-1792 AD) Shah
Wali Ullah (1703 –1762) Mawududi (1903-1979) and Syed Qutab
(1906-1966). Al-Qaeda ideology is further strengthened and
radicalized with the recent inclusion of "Takfiri" ideology in its
paradigm. The author clarifies the internal hierarchy of Al-Qaeda's
leadership and its influence on the organization. Al-Zawahiri is
considered to be the strategic mind and the real ideologue of AlQaeda. As far as Osama was concerned his role was more of a
spiritual figurehead than as a true leader of Al-Qaeda. This shows that
the death of Bin-Laden does not necessarily create an internal fissure
in the organization; instead, the organization may have become more
lethal with the death of Bin-Laden.
THE INSIDERS
The author very daringly investigates the Pakistani
army officers who had sympathies with the militants and close
ideological links with Al-Qaeda. This cadre of officers was very critical
of the Pakistan army, and many of them later left the Pakistan army
and joined Al-Qaeda. The author describes a few inside stories of
former army officers who joined the militants. One of the stories was
of two officer-ranked brothers; Capt Khurram (killed) and Maj,
Haroon who had fought in the Kargil war in 1999 and often referred
to the cowardice of the Pakistani officers. He was convinced that the
Pakistan army was incapable of fighting any major battle and had left
the Pakistan army and joined Al-Qaeda. He was responsible for
spreading several gruesome operations. The author describes the
likelihood of more Al-Qaeda sympathizers currently within the
Pakistan Army, and has given much detail about the so-called secret
links between the Taliban and ISI.
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THE END GAME
Saleem Shahzad believes that the defeat of the Western
coalition is imminent, but he rules out the possibility of a nuclear AlQaeda supported by Muslims states. Instead, he argues that AlQaeda's real strength is not its weaponry but its uncanny ability to
exploit unfolding events by working towards the collapse of its hi-tech
enemies. Shahzad ends with this stating that the current approach and
strategy that has been adopted by the Western coalition to eliminate
Al-Qaeda can never be successful, but does not suggest any strategy
himself that could be effective against Al-Qaeda. After a span of ten
years, it is much evident that America has made many miscalculations
in Afghanistan, which have together led the Al-Qaeda and Taliban to
victory.
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